Introduction
Several papers emphasize the importance of analyzing the welfare economics of public good and commodity policies jointly (see Lichtenberg and Zilberman, and Alston, Edwards and Freebairn for earlier works, and Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz for a more recent contribution). The latter two studies compare the social benefits from cost-reducing public research expenditures under alternative commodity policies with the benefits of research under no commodity policy.
Although no general conclusion can be drawn, Alston, Edwards and Freebairn determine thatfew, if any commodity policies (that favor farmers) result in an increase in the social benefits from research. This explains the emphasis by Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz, who go one step further than Alston, Edwards and Freebairn, that the social benefits from research expenditures may be negative in the presence of a commodity policy.
In this paper, we show that the results of studies like that of Alston, Edwards and Freebairn and of Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz depend on at least two critical factors. E.irs1, in comparing the social benefits of research with and without commodity policy, these studies (implicitly) assume that the level of the commodity policy instrument is held constant. This necessarily implies that the net transfer to farmers increases. We show that the reverse (commodity policy changes and net transfers constant) will generate very different results, namely, that the deadweight costs of price supports almost always declines with research expenditures. We conclude that both approaches are equally arbitrary.
Second, these studies fail to specify the underlying objective function or decision mechamsm of the government in assessing the efficacy of research expenditures in the presence of commodity policy. Anania and McCalla show that a social welfare maximizing government will have no commodity policy unless there are favorable international terms of trade effects. A framework of analysis is needed that has a government objective function which predicts the existence of alternative commodity policies in the first place. To this end, we specify three alternative objective functions, each having commodity policy endogenous (i.e., adjusting after an exogenous change in the level of cost reducing public research expenditures). We determine that the social benefits from research in the presence of endogenous commodity policy are higher than that determined by studies in the literature that assume an exogenous commodity policy. This has important policy implications.
Our analysis maintains the assumptions of the cited literature that research is exogenous and induces a shift in the supply curve. In addition to the effect on national welfare, we determine the distributional effects (while ignoring the effects on other countries). As in these other studies, we also assume that the choice of the policy instrument is exogenous, Le., that the specific commodity policy under consideration is assumed to be the only available instrument to redistribute income. We analyze the impact of research on deadweight costs for several stylized policy-trade combinations and government decision-making formulations. The policy-trade combinations include a production quota for a non-traded good, a target price with deficiency payment for a non-traded good, an import tariff for a small country, and a fixed price support with export subsidies for a large country.
The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we have an endogenous ~ of the commodity policy, using alternative government objective functions with each predicting commodity policy in all cases. The equilibrium commodity policy, however, adjusts following the introduction of the cost-reducing research, thereby augmenting the aggregate effect of commodity policy on the benefits from research. The extent of adjustment in commodity policy depends on both the specific policy instrument under consideration and the assumed objective function of the government. This paper is organized as follows. The following section outlines a general model. In section 3, we compare the social benefits of research under the assumption (eg, Alston, Edwards and Freebairn) of a fixed policy instrument level (for several commodity policies) with those
In section 4, we analyze two stylized commodity policies under three alternative government objective functions: (a) maximize income subject to a farm income constraint; (b) maximize a weighted preference function; and (c) maximize political support. The social benefits from research in the presence of a commodity policy are found to be mostly higher than that of the literature which assumes commodity policy instrument levels to be fixed. The final section provides some concluding remarks as to the policy implications vis-a-vis the received wisdom of the literature analyzing the welfare economics of research and commodity policy.
A General Model
Define e 1 as the net income of individual i prior to the introduction of research and commodity policy. Consider now the introduction of a commodity policy that redistributes income between sectors. Define t 1 (t) as the net aggregate income transfer for i resulting from the commodity policy. Define yA as the income of agricultural producers, which can be decomposed into income from market activities (e A ) and income transfers from the commodity policy (t A ):
[1] yA = eA + tA Define yB as the income of consumers and taxpayers: 1
[2] yB = eB + tB Typical commodity policies like price supports, import tariffs, export subsidies and production quotas induce deadweight costs. Define ti(O) = 0, tACt) = t and tB(t) = -t -c(t), where c(t) represents the deadweight costs. Therefore, t > 0 describes the aggregate net income transfer to farmers, with agriculture subsidized by consumers and/or taxpayers.
How are the benefits from research affected under these market distortions induced by commodity policy? The total effect of research on national income is given by:
For simplicity, we combine consumers and taxpayers into one group.
I
Equation [3] indicates that the impact of research on total income is the sum of the change in market incomes (de1/d't) from both producers and consumers (through improved productivity and lower costs/prices), minus the change in total deadweight costs (dc/d't) and the costs of financing the investment (reflected in the last term, which ignores the excess burden of taxation). The social optimal research expenditure level 't m maximizes total national income Y in the absence of commodity policy and is determined by:
A comparison of conditions [3] and [4] indicates that dc/d't is critical in determining how much total income will diverge from maximum income due to commodity policy. Alston, Edwards and Freebaim's analysis, for example, indicates that the net impact of research on deadweight costs is indeterminant, depending on the specific policy and the significance/status of the sector in world markets. However, the latter study indicates that in most cases cost-reducing research increases deadweight costs of commodity policy distortions (dc/d't > 0), which lowers the aggregate social benefits from research. 2 Taking Alston, Edwards and Freebaim as an example, the literature compares the benefits from cost-reducing research in the presence of different commodity policies with the benefits from research under free-market conditions. In our notation, this is the difference between flY/fl't at a given commodity policy level and flY/fl't without commodity policy. Let x represent the level of a given commodity policy instrument. Then the standard basis of comparison can be written as flY(x)/fl't -flY(O)/fl't, and is given by:
We can disaggregate the total impact of public research 't on deadweight costs of the commodity policy (dc/d't):
where the first term, 8c/ftr, represents the impact of 't on c for a given level of the net income transfer t. The second term 8c/at reflects the change in deadweight costs if there is a change in the net income transfer 1. The optimal transfer t* can be solved from a specific government objective function, which also determines the magnitude of the final term at*/ftr, reflecting the extent to which the optimal transfer t* changes with public research.
For example, Alston, Edwards and Freebaim's analysis assumes that the level of the commodity policy x is held constant as public research investments increase. Therefore, they (implicitly) assume that the government increases the transfer to agriculture at the same time when they invest (more) in research, i.e. at*/ftr > 0 in their analysis. 4 As such, t* is implicitly endogenous in their model, because t* adjusts with an increase in't.
To illustrate the importance of any underlying assumption, let us consider the (equally arbitrary) assumption that the net transfer to farmers is held constant (i.e. at*/ftr = 0) for four stylized commodity policies. 
Output quota (closed economy)

Target price and deficiency payments (closed economy)
Figure 2 depicts a target price Toto producers and a market clearing price Po paid by consumers. The net transfer to farmers is area HIBA and the increase in consumer surplus is area ABJK. Taxpayer expenditures are area HIJK and social costs are area BU. Now consider the effects of public research expenditures that shifts the supply curve to S('t). With a fixed target price, deadweight costs increase to CLM and market prices fall to Pl' However, if the transfer t* is to be held at the initial level (= HIBA), then the target price is reduced to T 1 and consumer prices rise to P2' Social costs decrease from BU to CRT, with t* = URCV = HIBA. Figure 3 shows the impact of research with an import tariff for a small country. Farmers receive To above the world market price Po, sustained by an import tariff To -Po. Domestic consumption is Qd(O) and supply is at QS(O). The net transfer to farmers induced by the import tariff is area ABED with deadweight costs associated of areas BIE and NKM.
Import tariff (small country)
The public research investment would induce an increase in the transfer t if the import tariff is maintained at To -Po. But in order to keep the transfer t constant, the import tariff has to decline to -T l -Po. Domestic prices fall from To to T l . Consumption and production both increase, to Qd ('t) and QS('t), respectively. Deadweight costs c('t) equal the sum of areas FJH and RLM. It is evident from Figure 3 that c('t) < c(O): hence ~c/~'t < O. In the appendix, we show formally that 8c/fJt> 0, Be/at < 0, c?c/a.
2 > 0, and that c?c/atOt <,=,> for t > = < 0 in this case of an import tariff for a small country.
Export subsidy with afixed support price (large economy)
The free market equilibrium before and after the introduction of public research expenditures for a large country exporter is depicted in Figure 4a . The shift in domestic supply also shifts the excess supply curve along the excess demand curve ED facing the exporter, resulting in a new world price equilibrium Pt. Exports increase to X('t) and consumer surplus increases to ABCD.
The change in producers surplus is area IHFG minus area AEID. Whether consumers or producers benefit more from research investment 't in the absence of market intervention depends on trade levels and on the supply and demand elasticities. 5
Consider a fixed support price To with a (variable) export subsidy To -PI in Figure 4b .
Production increases from Q(O) to Q(t) and exports increase from X(O) to X(t). The world market
price falls to Pl' Per unit export subsidies equal To -Pl' Total taxpayer expenditures equal area JKLM = RSTV. The net transfer to agrtculture is the area ASEZ and the change in consumer surplus is -ARBZ.
Deadweight costs c now includes domestic consumption and production distortions (areas RXB and SEW, respectively, with RXB + SEW = KNO) and subsidies to foreign consumers, (equal to area YOLM = XWTV).
With To fixed, deadweight costs increase with research investment 'to However, when tis held constant, To needs to decline. The impact on deadweight costs is less than what it was when
To was held constant. Whether deadweight costs increase or decrease depends on several factors, most importantly on the elasticity of domestic and foreign demand, and of domestic supply.
-5 Using the same notation as in the mathematical derivations of the appendix, it follows that without commodity Clearly, the impact of research on deadweight costs depends critically on the assumptions regarding the determination of the observed (optimal) level of the net farm income transfer t*, and hence of the commodity policy instrument level x. The analysis above compares two arbitrary rules for determining EJt*/EJt: fix either the net farm income transfer or the level of the commodity policy instrument. It is more appropriate to specify a particular policy objective function to determine precisely what aspect of redistributive policy is endogenous in order to appropriately evaluate the implications of commodity policy on social benefits to research. We do so in the following section for three alternative decision-mechanisms.
Endogenous Commodity Policy under Three Government Decision Models
Maximize Income Subject to a Farm Income Constraint
A government maximizing aggregate social income subject to a farm income constraint is depicted by the following decision problem:
[6] _MaxY=yA+yB S.t. yA ~ yO Assume e A < yO such that t* is positive. It follows that yA(t*) = yO, with t* = yO -eA. What -determines the magnitude of EJt*/EJt (and consequently dc/d't) under this model formulation? It will depend on how research affects endowment incomes for prodticers and consumers (e A and e B ) with no commodity policy. Research reduces consumer prices (unless it is a small country) so yB('t) ~ yB(o). It follows that at*/&r. < for aeA/&r. > 0 (and vice versa). More specifically, at*/&r. . = -aeA/&r.. If research increases e A to the extent that e A ('t) > yO, then t* will become zero. The critical factor in this model is the impact of't on e A , which depends on the structure of the sector (de Gorter and Zilberman) and the commodity policy instrument.
Consider first the case of a small country importer with an import tariff (Figure 3 ).
Producer surplus increases with research (BeA/&r. > 0). Hence at*/&r. < O. Tariffs fall to T z -po.
As a consequence, deadweight costs fall to areas HUV + WYM < BIE + NMK. Although the new tariff depicted in Figure 3 is still positive, it need not be so. It depends on the productivity of research, the initial size of the tariff, the trade situation and the supply/demand elasticities.
In the case of a closed economy, equilibrium prices will decline with an increase in research. Consider the case of a target price with deficiency payments. Without the target price, the gross gain to consumers is area ABCV and for producers, area FECG minus area ABEV (see of the gross benefits depends on the demand and supply elasticities. In the appendix, we formally derive that with demand more elastic than supply (1t < a), benefits for consumers will be smaller than for producers (deA/d't > deB/d't <=> a> P), and vice versa.
Can at*/&r. be positive in this scenario? Price reductions will be larger with a more inelastic demand and a more elastic supply. This will have a more adverse effect on producer surplus. Figure 5 shows how, with perfectly inelastic demand (Dl), the induced equilibrium price change equals the vertical shift of the supply curve (i.e. the reduction in marginal costs induced by research). Producer income e A changes from area ABD to area EFG with research. By construction, ABD = EFG and therefore deA/d't = O. With demand less than perfectly inelastic (D2), e A shifts from ABD to HIG. As HIG = HIFE + EGF < EGF = ABD, it follows that deA/d't ->0.
Therefore, we can conclude that under this decision model that at*/&r. ~ 0 always (with at*/ &r. < 0 unless demand is perfectly inelastic). As a consequence dc/d't < Bc/&r., and the aggregate impact of research on deadweight costs is even more negative under this decision-model than when 8t*/fJt = 0 in our earlier analysis.
Government Maximizing a Weighted Income Preference Function
A government maximizing a weighted income preference function is given by:
Max eyA + yB where e :2: 0 is the relative weight farm incomes have in the government's objective function. The optimal transfer for this government is determined by
which implies that t* > 0 for e > 1: commodity policy favors farmers if they have a higher weight than consumers.
How will 't affect the optimal transfer t* under this decision problem? Applying the implicit function theorem to [8] , one can derive:
8t*/fJt = -(ff2c/8tfJt)/(ff2c/8t 2 ).
Condition [9] indicates that t* will increase if research induces marginal deadweight costs to decrease for a given transfer, provided that the deadweight cost function is convex (Le. ff2c/8t 2 > 0). The change in optimal transfer only depends on the deadweight cost function. If research makes it less (more) expensive at the margin to redistribute income, the government will increase (reduce) the transfer. The effect of't on marginal deadweight costs will, again, depend on the particular commodity policy instrument.
In the appendix, we show that ff2c/8tfJt < 0 and ff2c/8t 2 > 0 for an import tariff (t > 0) in a small country. Using condition [9] , this implies that the optimal transfer t* increases with research expenditures 't (8t*/fJt > 0). Therefore, dc/d't > &JfJt, with fJc/fJt < 0 as shown before. Can the , increase in deadweight costs induced by the optimal transfer t* -be more than offset by the reduction in the deadweight costs per unit of transfer, i.e. can (Bc/8t)(8t*/fJt) + Bc/fJt > 0 despite fJc/fJt < O?
In the appendix, we derive the following condition: Bc/Ot = (l+(a/7t)) (pt -pW)/(pt _ pm), where a and 7t are the slopes of the linear supply and demand functions, pW is the world market price, pt the domestic price and pm the intercept of the supply function with the vertical axis.
Condition [8] for the case of a tariff in a small country becomes:
[10] (pL pW)/(pL pm) = (8 -1)(l+(a/7t))
Given our assumptions, all parameters on the right hand side of condition [10] are unaffected by 'to Hence, for pt > pW > pm, it must be that 0 < (8 -1) (l +a;f3)) < 1, which in turn implies that apt/apm < O. As't induces a decline in pm, this means that pt will increase, inducing an increase in deadweight costs c(t): dc/dt> O.
Notice that, for a similar reason, Bc/8't < 0 and Ot*/8't > 0 because there is a reduction in total (Bc/8't) or marginal (a2c/Ot8't) deadweight costs per unit of transfer. In this case, the term Ot*/8't> 0 more than offsets the term ac/8't < O.
In case of a target price with deficiency payments in a closed economy, B2c/Ot8't < 0 and the sign of B2c/Ot2 is conditional on the elasticity of demand and supply. With demand more elastic than supply (a > ~), the deadweight cost function is convex (a2c/Ot2 > 0) (and vice versa if supply is more elastic than demand). This implies that the transfer t* will decline when supply is more elastic than demand. In this case, the total effect of't on deadweight costs is unconditionally negative: dc/d't < 0 for a < ~, with ac/8't < 0, ac/Ot > 0, and Ot*/8't < O. When supply is less elastic than demand and the deadweight cost function is concave, Ot*/8't is positive. The impact on dc/d't is then conditional on other factors.
Maximizing Political Support
Now consider the case when the government maximizes political support (de Gorter and Tsur). Following Swinnen and de Gorter (1993) and Swinnen (1994) , assume that the government solves the following specific problem: -subject to the government budget constraint, where SI is political support provided by the agents in the economy, which has the following form:
. .
The functions SI(.), Ul(.), and therefore V 1 (.), are continuous, at least twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Assume that both sectors pay equal shares of the research expenditures, and that there are no distortions caused by the taxes in financing these investments. Hence:
. . .
The first order condition for the politically optimal level of the net farm income transfer t* for a given level of the public investment, financed by tax 'to, is given by:
where SI V and Ul y are first order derivatives with respect to their respective arguments. The size and sign oft* depends on (a) the deadweight costs associated with the commodity policy, (b) the relative pre-policy endowment incomes between agriculture and industry, and (c) the distributional impact of the public investment (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995 (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995) . This means that research investment -r will affect the marginal political support levels for a given transfer level t, and as a consequence, -r will affect the politically optimal t*.
Let us discuss condition [15] in detail, for the case of a small country import tariff. First, Ctt > 0, which implies that the denominator is always negative. The sign of the numerator depends on yA-r and yB-r. First, define -r i as the optimal research level for sector i, which is determined as y\(-r l ) = O. A support maximising government will never implement an investment level outside the interval [-rA,-r B ], because both sectors will support shifting the investment level inside this interval. Furthermore, for every -r within this interval, it must be that yA-r and yB-r have opposite signs (unless one is zero).
A B
Recall that yA-r = e -r -(1/2) and yB-r = e -r -(1/2) -C-r. In the case of a small country import tariff, e A -r > 0, e B -r = 0 and aclm < O. This implies that all the research benefits in the absence of commodity policy go to farmers. Consider what would happen with t*. In the absence of market distortions, C-r = 0, Ct-r = 0, yA-r > 0 and yB-r < 0 which would imply that the first and second term in condition [15] 's denominator are negative and the third term zero, and thus that fJt*lm < O. In general, it is politically optimal for the government to compensate the sector which benefits relatively less from the investment by raising the transfer to this sector. In this case, B agriculture benefits more from the investment (e A -r > e -r = 0) and so the transfer t* decreases.
The political interaction effect induces a decline in the transfer t* (and thus of the commodity policy instrument level).
This result is mitigated because (a) deadweight costs per unit of transfer decline with-r -(c-r < 0) and (b) marginal deadweight costs per unit of transfer decrease (ct-r < 0). It cannot be ruled out that these "economic interaction effect (EIEs)" can under certain circumstances more than offset the "political interaction effects (PIE)". The latter (Ct-r < 0) makes the last term of the numeration of [12] positive. The former (c-r < 0) increases yB-r: consumers benefit because the deadweight costs on the existing transfer declines: yB't = -C't -(1/2). With yA't = eA't -(1/2), A B . th A y 't > Y 't requIres at e 't > -c't. 7 Simulations indicate that, while the (secondary) EIEs mitigate the (primary) PIEs, they do not offset them, except under extreme assumptions on the parameters (Swinnen and de Gorter, 1995) . Therefore, the simulations suggest that, in general, a*/ETt < 0 will result in this case, implying that dc/d't < O. In summary, we emphasize that the same factor which reduces the impact of't on deadweight costs c (Bc/ETt < 0), causes c to increase, because it induces an increase in the equilibrium transfer (or reduces it less).8
In the case of a target price and deficiency payment, the effects also depend on the relative elasticity of supply and demand. When demand is inelastic and supply elastic (a > P) agriculture benefits more from research than consumers in the absence of market intervention. (e A 't > eB't).
This tends to increase the optimal transfer. This effect is mitigated by the negative effect of't on total and marginal deadweight costs: C't < 0 and Ct't < O. If eA't > eB't -C't, then the first and second term of the numeration of [15] will be negative. With Ct't < 0, the last term will be positive. If the eA't > eB't effect is stronger, then a*/ETt < 0 for a > p. Combining this with Bc/ETt < 0 yields that dc/d't < 0 under these conditions. When a < p, all three terms of the numerator of [15] are positive. However now the third term of the denominator is positive (while the other two are negative) as Ctt < 0 for a < p. If the first two terms are stronger, a*/ETt > 0 and the net effect on dc/d't is conditional, again.
Summary and Discussion
As summarized in Table 2 , in only one case does research unconditionally increase deadweight costs of commodity policy (small country import tariff with government maximizing a weighted preference function). In three cases, the impact is unconditionally negative: deadweight costs decrease with research. In two more cases, deadweight costs will decrease if PIEs outweigh EIEs in determining 81:*/81:. 9 In Table 1 , the only policy/trade combination that could have of research increasing deadweight costs for a given transfer (Bc/fJt > 0) was export subsidies in a large country with a fixed price support. Apart from the fact that no export subsidy program operates this way (loan rates and intervention prices vary in the United States and the European Union, respectively), it is still not likely that deadweight costs increase with fixed support prices. In the appendix, we show that Bc/fJt > 0 may result when the export subsidy is small, when foreign and domestic demand are inelastic, and when domestic supply is elastic. But we also show that under these (elasticity) conditions, agriculture is likely to benefit most from research (see the appendix for a formal derivation). Therefore, research will induce a government (maximizing either social welfare or political support) to reduce the optimal transfer t* to agriculture. This has the opposite effect on deadweight costs and so may offset the Bc/fJt factor.
Concluding Remarks
There is a burgeoning literature analyzing the welfare economics of public research and commodity policies jointly (for example, see Alston and Martin; Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz) .
Social benefits from research under alternative commodity policies are compared with the benefits of research under no commodity policy. The consensus is that commodity policies result in a decrease in the social benefits of research, and indeed the latter may go negative. The policy implications are very grave and are best summarized by Murphy, Furtan and Schmitz (p. 162):
"Why continue investing in agricultural research ... if the major impact is ... additional export subsidies? Are the results from past studies showing impressive returns to research still valid?" -We show in this paper that these results depend on the critical assumption that the level of the commodity policy instrument is held constant (necessarily requiring an increase in the net transfer to farmers). We show that the reverse (commodity policy changes and net transfers constant) will generate very different results, namely, that the deadweight costs of price supports almost always decline with research expenditures. Indeed, in every case, the Alston, Edwards and Freebairn methodology yields smaller social benefits from research in the presence of commodity policy.
We conclude that both approaches are equally arbitrary and to overcome this, one needs to specify the underlying objective function or decision-mechanism of the government in assessing the efficacy of research in the presence of commodity policy. We detennine that the social benefits from research in the presence of endogenous commodity policy are higher than that detennined by studies in the literature that assume an exogenous commodity policy. This has important policy implications in that governments should be encouraged to continue productive research investments in the presence of commodity policy.
The distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we have an endogenous commodity policy, using alternative government objective functions with each predicting commodity policy in all cases. The equilibrium commodity policy, however, adjusts following the introduction of the cost-reducing research, thereby augmenting the aggregate effect of commodity policy on the benefits from research. We show that the extent of adjustment in commodity policy depends on both the specific policy instrument under consideration and the assumed objective function of the government.
Further research should have both research and commodity policy endogenous (de Gorter, Nielson and Rausser) . Nevertheless, our analysis shows the importance of departing from the stringent assumptions of the literature whereby the level of the commodity policy is exogenous and the net income transfer to farmers changes with research. where 0 = -dpm/dt reflects the productivity of the investment function. Hence, eA't > eB't if demand is more elastic than supply (a > 7t).
The transfer t (which we define the net aggregate transfer to agriculture) is:
[a. 1.5] with the deadweight costs c associated with t being:
[a. 
A. 2 Import tariff in a small open economy
The deadweight costs c associated with transfer t with an import tariff are:
(pt_pw). apt lat
With apt/at = a/(pt -pm) > 0 , it follows that 8clat > 0 for an import tariff (t > 0) and 8clat < 0 when t < 0 (e.g. in the case ofan export tax Therefore, this example is consistent with the assumptions of our model.
The impact of public investment 't on deadweight costs c associated with transfer policy t, for a given level of t, is:
To determine the sign of 8c/8t we use the fact that t remains constant (ceteris paribus), i.e.
[a.2.5]
where () = -dpm/d't reflects the productivity of the investment function. It follows apt/8t >,=,< 0 for t <,=,> 0, assuming that prices never fully prohibit domestic production (i.e. pt > pm always).
Combining [a.2.4] and [a.2.6] yields that 8c/8t < 0 for both t > 0 and t < 0, i.e. deadweight costs for a given level of transfer decrease with an increase in public investment. If tariffs are zero, obviously there is no effect of't on deadweight costs (Bc/8t = 0 for t = 0). In conclusion, C't < 0 and C'tt < 0 always (unless t = 0), while Ct> 0 for t > 0 and Ct < 0 for t < 0 This implies that producers gain less than consumers from an increase in public investment (eA't > eB't) if Qd(pW)/Qs(pW) > [(lI7t) + (l/y)]/(lIa). This is more likely to occur when the self sufficiency ratio is greater, when domestic and foreign demand are less elastic (i.e. smaller 7t and y) and when supply is more elastic (larger a). These conditions are characteristics of agriculture in developed countries, such as the ED and North America.
Consider now the case when the government imposes a minimum guaranteed price pt sustained by a variable export subsidy or import tariff, which is the difference between pt and the effective world market price pc. Transfer tis: The first part of [a.3.8] is negative for t>0 (P<l), but the second part is always positive. Therefore, the sign of 8Qx/ETt cannot be determined unambiguously. It is more likely to be negative if protection is higher (P lower) and if domestic demand is more elastic (7t smaller). If supply and foreign demand are more elastic (a and y smaller) the last (positive) term increases, but also the first term. No.
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